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Labour‟s „Juridification‟ of the Constitution 
 
ROGER MASTERMAN* 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article responds to a number of points made by Mark Bevir in his recent article „The Westminster 
Model, Governance and Judicial Reform‟ [2008] Parliamentary Affairs 559, in which Bevir highlights 
the „increasing role of the courts in the processes of collective decision making‟ which has been the 
result of, inter alia (but of particular importance to Bevir‟s argument), the passage and implementation 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.  This article puts forward an 
alternate view of Labour‟s recent record on constitutional reform, arguing that, while the contemporary 
constitution may have seen an increased degree of „juridification‟ of the sort described by Bevir, the 
strengthening and development of political mechanisms of accountability has also been of considerable 
importance to Labour‟s constitutional reform programme, and that, as a result, the „juridification‟ of the 
constitution is not the incontrovertible and relentless process that Bevir appears to suggest.    
 
Mark Bevir‟s article „The Westminster Model, Governance and Judicial Reform‟ 
addresses the implications of specific aspects of recent Labour administrations‟ 
constitutional reform programme for democratic governance in the UK.  Amongst the 
numerous discrete reforms implemented, Bevir highlights the „increasing role of the 
courts in the processes of collective decision making‟1 which has been the result of, 
inter alia (but of particular importance to Bevir‟s argument), the passage and 
implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Constitutional Reform Act 
2005.  Bevir‟s contention is that recent reforms have contributed to a continuing 
„juridification‟ of the constitution which has resulted in a corresponding narrowing of 
the sphere of effective democratic decision-making.   
Bevir‟s synopsis of the meanings of „juridification‟ can be taken to cover a 
range of interrelated trends and developments.  Citing the work of Lars Blichner and 
Anders Molander
2
 – with which he appears to sympathise – Bevir writes that 
„juridification‟ can take a number of forms:  
 
1. „… “consititutive juridification” is the process by which the norms of a political 
system are created or changed to improve the competencies and role of the legal 
system‟; 
2. „juridification can occur when legal regulation is expanded or increasingly 
differentiated‟; 
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3. „juridification takes place when social actors, in and outside government, 
increasingly refer to the law to resolve conflicts‟;  
4. „[a] fourth type of juridification is identified with the courts and the judges 
playing an increasingly prominent role in lawmaking‟; 
5. „a fifth type of juridification is a vague process in which people increasingly come 
to define themselves and others in legal terms, such as what it means to be an EU 
citizen.‟3  
 
Hence, „juridification‟ can encompass a range of tangible developments; the 
proliferation of legislation as a tool of governance and regulation, the formulation of 
legislative or constitutional standards by elected legislatures, the ability of the judicial 
branch to make law and the utilisation of law as a tool of dispute resolution for 
example.  Equally, „juridification‟ can, on this reading, include a number of more 
intangible developments including the awareness of an individual of their status, or 
potential, as a legal actor, the increased propensity for individuals and groups to see 
courts as the appropriate forum for the resolution of social disputes, and perhaps even 
simply an increased use of legal terminology in discourse.  These developments are 
all – to varying degrees – evident in the United Kingdom‟s recent constitutional 
history.   
However, as Blichner and Molander recognise, the concept of „juridification‟ 
is „ambiguous‟ and is often used interchangeably with ideas of „judicialisation‟ or 
„legalisation.‟4  The focus of this piece will lie in the reading of „juridification‟ which 
suggests that through the formulation of legal standards which allow for judicial input 
into their definition and regulation, the scope and range of decisions which can be 
made in the democratic sphere is necessarily reduced, and the effectiveness of elected 
institutions of government lessened.  The use of courts, as opposed to the political 
process, as a mechanism for restraining or scrutinising the actions of elected 
politicians is central to this conception of „juridification,‟ and objections to the 
extension of judicial power in this regard – especially so far as it requires engagement 
with the substance of policy choices – have proceeded on basis of the effective 
disenfranchisement of the electorate which results when decisions taken by elected 
representatives can be overturned by a small group of unelected, unaccountable 
judges.
5
  Increasing the role of the courts in determining the legitimate limits of 
executive (and possibly legislative) action might well be more accurately referred to 
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as the „judicialisation‟ or „legalisation‟ of the constitution, but for the sake of 
consistency the terminology adopted by Bevir will be adhered to in this piece.      
Access to a court structure in the event of alleged ultra vires activity carried 
out by a public authority or servant is of course a basic requirement of the rule of 
law.
6
  Perhaps the most obvious example of the „juridification‟ of the United 
Kingdom‟s constitution in this regard has been the development and expansion of the 
judicial review jurisdiction during the latter years of the twentieth century.
7
  The 
development of judicial review led in turn to an increased judicial engagement with 
decisions with social policy and resource allocation implications and increasingly ran 
in parallel with a growing perception of the failure of established political 
mechanisms of holding government to account.  This weakness of the „political 
constitution‟ was only highlighted by the increased strength of the executive branch 
vis-à-vis Parliament, and further exacerbated by changes in governmental 
management and the delivery of governmental services.  The growth of executive 
agencies and the increased propensity to contract-out the business of government in 
particular came with adverse consequences for parliamentary lines of accountability 
which were exposed in a number of high-profile controversies during the mid-1990s.
8
  
Such were the perceived failings of constitutional conventions and parliamentary 
practice – established „political‟ mechanisms of accountability – to accommodate 
these new techniques of governance that commentators questioned the continuing 
relevance of, for example, the doctrine of ministerial responsibility as a tool of 
ensuring accountability.
9
  As Eric Barendt argued in 1997:  
 
… constitutional conventions are quite worthless as a check on the power of 
central Government … the conventions regulating the relationship of the 
political executive to Parliament and the public (ministerial responsibility and 
collective Cabinet responsibility) are at the mercy of the changing attitudes of 
politicians …10 
 
This lack of faith in the mechanisms of the „political constitution‟ lay behind many of 
the proposed constitutional reforms of the incoming Blair administration in 1997 with 
its commitments to decentralisation, subsidiarity and the strengthening of 
Parliament.
11
  But while the implementation of this wide-ranging programme of 
reform has – for the generally incremental development of the British constitution – 
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been revolutionary, this revolution has not yet seen the jettisoning of established 
constitutional features to the extent suggested by Bevir.  The essential characteristics 
of the constitution remain unquestioned; Parliament, and not the judiciary, remains 
the dominant law-making force in the constitution, while the primary role of the 
courts remains the interpretation and application of the law, not the design and 
implementation of policy.     
This piece does not seek to deny that the sphere of influence possessed by the 
judicial branch over decisions taken by elected officials has significantly expanded 
over the last half-century, nor that certain reforms enacted by recent Labour 
administrations have contributed to a further realignment of governmental power in 
this regard.  Rather, this piece proposes an alternate reading of recent Labour 
administrations‟ constitutional reforms which challenges that put forward by Bevir.  
While it is accepted that the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998 caused a 
notable repositioning of judicial power vis-à-vis that of the elected branches of 
government, Bevir‟s analysis of the Act neglects to examine the careful attempts 
made by the Labour Government responsible to preserve the supremacy of democratic 
decision making in the domestic protection of human rights.  The Human Rights Act 
model was adopted for the very reason that it accommodated the possibility of 
disagreement between judges and politicians, and – in the event of the making of a 
judicial declaration of incompatibility – allows the latter the discretion of how, and 
indeed whether, to amend the disputed statute in line with judicial opinion.  It is 
further contended that Bevir‟s suggestion that the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 has 
directly contributed to the processes of „juridification‟ is slightly perplexing.  First, 
that Act does not extend the reach of judicial power into new spheres.  Secondly, 
rather than narrowing the range of effective democratic decision-making, the 
Constitutional Reform Act can be said to promote greater openness and accountability 
for the reason that it removes the power of one unelected Minister to effectively 
control a range of senior judicial appointments and, by allowing the Lord Chancellor 
to sit in the House of Commons, improves the ability of elected representatives to 
hold the occupant of that office directly to account.   
Finally, it is suggested that, when Labour‟s constitutional reforms since 1997 
are taken as a whole, it is possible to discern a significant, parallel trend evident in the 
notable attempts to extend the depth and range of the accountability of government 
through participation in the political process.  This trend is most obvious in the 
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devolution of power from central government to sub-national assemblies and 
administrations, and in ongoing attempts to strengthen Parliament as a representative 
body and as an institution capable of effectively holding the executive branch to 
account.  Contrary to Bevir‟s claims therefore, it is entirely arguable that the 
cumulative effect of Labour‟s reforms has been to rejuvenate the place of political 
accountability – alongside a limited judicial protection of human rights – within the 
constitution.  In other words, the „juridification‟ of the British constitution may not be 
the incontrovertible and relentless process that Bevir appears to suggest.   
 
THE PERSISTENCE OF THE DICEYAN CONSTITUTION   
Part of the difficulty with Bevir‟s assessment is the insistence that parliamentary 
sovereignty remains the monolithic principle declared by Dicey in his Introduction to 
the Study of the Law of the Constitution, and that our appreciation of new mechanisms 
and institutions of government is hampered by a lingering attachment to a constitution 
which can be ultimately distilled into fairly straightforward terms: Parliament makes 
the law and the judges apply it, faithful to the words chosen by the legislature.  On 
such an analysis, Parliament‟s legal authority is absolute and the judicial role is purely 
mechanical.   
While the sovereignty of Parliament as a legal doctrine holds that Parliament 
can legislate on whatever subject, in whatever terms it chooses, the doctrinal certainty 
of Dicey‟s conception of parliamentary supremacy has always been tempered by the 
demands of contemporary political practice and climate.  Dicey himself recognised 
that while the sovereignty of Parliament might well be an „undoubted legal fact‟ there 
were nevertheless „many enactments … which Parliament never would and (to speak 
plainly) never could pass.‟12  While the legislature may possess the theoretical legal 
power to enact unpopular or Draconian legislation, should it in practice do so, 
„Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost.‟13  In 
the continuing absence of a general judicial power to invalidate parliamentary 
legislation, the constraints on the legal power of Parliament – excluding those 
imposed by the United Kingdom‟s accession to the European Union14 – remain 
political rather than legal in nature.
15
  As a result, as Lord Steyn observed in the 
House of Lords decision of Jackson v Attorney General:  
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The classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of 
Parliament, pure and absolute as it was, can now be seen to be out of place in 
the modern United Kingdom.  Nevertheless, the supremacy of Parliament is 
still the general principle of our constitution.
16
 
 
While Mark Tushnet may have recently been able to argue that „[f]or all practical 
purposes, the Westminster model has been withdrawn from sale,‟17 the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty on which it is based has shown itself to be sufficiently fluid 
to be able to accommodate the voluntary acceptance of limitations to Parliament‟s 
legislative monopoly which took effect on the United Kingdom‟s accession to the 
European Union,
18
 the devolution of power to sub-national assemblies and 
legislatures,
19
 and the ability of the decisions of one Parliament to control the manner 
and form in which subsequent legislative decisions might take effect.
20
  The 
contemporary constitutional value of Dicey‟s conception of sovereignty lies not 
therefore in „a constitution within which popular participation was restrained,‟21 but in 
the ultimate commitment that the principle shows to government by elected and 
removable representatives, rather than by unelected and unaccountable judges.
22
  The 
British constitution remains political in the sense that the ultimate source of 
constitutional authority is the elected Westminster Parliament; judges do not possess a 
general power to disapply, strike down or otherwise invalidate legislative decisions 
debated and endorsed in the legislature.   
Yet, equally, it would be mistaken to regard the constitution as being so 
„political‟ in character as to deny the judicial branch a meaningful role.  While it is 
technically correct to suggest that the judicial branch is not – in the British system – a 
co-equal branch of government, nor is it perhaps realistic to describe the judicial 
branch as being entirely subservient to the will of Parliament.  The judicial branch do 
possesses a limited law-making role in respect of the common law,
23
 while the 
authoritative ability of the courts to declare the meaning of statute law and to act as a 
check on the exercise of discretionary power demonstrates the coercive authority 
wielded by the judicial branch over the elected arms of government; to paraphrase 
Lord Templeman‟s dicta in M v Home Office, the executive does not obey the law as a 
matter of grace, but as a matter of necessity.
24
   
 It would also be a mistake however, to assume that the „legal‟ and the 
„political‟ spheres of courts and politicians and officials operate in complete isolation 
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of each other.  Drawing on the Dicey‟s legalistic interpretation of sovereignty, this is 
the trap into which Bevir falls.  The reading of „juridification‟ adopted by Bevir 
appears to contemplate no sphere of interaction between political and legal processes, 
seeming to argue that, once Parliament has enacted legislation on a given subject, 
future „democratic‟ decisions in respect of that subject are, if not precluded, then 
strictly curtailed.  Bevir suggests that:  
 
… when a representative institution creates a rule on an issue and hands the 
application of that rule to the courts, it thereby constrains the space for any 
future democratic decisions on that issue.
25
 
 
Obviously, it would be mistaken to say that once a certain rule had been established 
by Act of Parliament, then that rule could not be overturned or replaced – following 
deliberation in the legislature – by a subsequent Act of Parliament.  This does not 
appear to be what Bevir suggests.  Instead, he puts forward a viewpoint which 
nevertheless appears to erroneously regard „politics‟ and „law‟ as entirely distinct 
disciplines which do not, and cannot, interact, under which the former is „good‟, the 
latter, seemingly „bad.‟  On this reading of the constitutional separation of power 
there would appear to be little value to be found in either the capability of the judicial 
branch of government to resolve disputes independently of party political 
considerations, or in the ability of the individual to regulate his or her conduct by 
reference to a relatively stable and certain body of law.  Such a „stark separation of 
legal rule from political principle‟ is, as T. R. S. Allan has argued, „ultimately 
incoherent.‟26   
Bevir appears to suggest that once a rule is framed in legislative terms, to be 
enforced by the courts, the implementation of that rule becomes a matter of „law‟ – 
and therefore indicative of the juridification of the political process – and the „scope 
for democratic processes within civil society or within governmental institutions 
themselves‟ to influence the exercise and enforcement of that rule becomes 
increasingly narrow.
27
  While it might well be possible to suggest that the 
implementation of a given rule – policed by the judicial branch – may well constrain 
the exercise of future decisions taken within the rule‟s scope of application, the 
establishment of such a regime does not simply transform every decision taken to one 
of „law‟ in which „political‟ considerations are irrelevant.  In the first instance, such a 
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view almost completely ignores the fact that the enactment of legislation is a process 
which often follows on the back of manifesto commitments endorsed by the 
electorate, frequently occurs following lengthy and broad public consultation, and 
only ever occurs after deliberation in both Houses of Parliament.  Most importantly, 
the enactment of parliamentary legislation reflects a policy decision that legal 
regulation is the most appropriate mechanism by which to achieve a particular policy 
goal.  While one might criticise defects in the consultation process, lament apathy at 
the polls or question the rigour with which Parliament scrutinises draft legislation, it 
must also be acknowledged that legal regulation has been chosen as the appropriate 
tool of public administration by elected representatives.     
The primary role of the courts in this regard, in the interpretation and 
application of statutory purpose, is not an exercise in which the text of the statute is 
considered to the exclusion of all other sources of information and authority.  
However, the determination of legislative intent consistent with the rule of law is 
accompanied by a recognition that Parliament remains the dominant source of 
(political and legal) authority in the constitution.  It is to accommodate their relative 
lack of democratic or representative legitimacy that the courts have long attempted to 
avoid the judicial review of the merits of executive and administrative decisions,
28
 
have not gone the way of the United States Supreme Court in establishing a common 
law power to strike down Acts of Parliament,
29
 and – increasingly in the Human 
Rights Act era – have adopted a variable standard of review which affords, in the 
appropriate circumstances, a degree of respect to the decisions of the elected branches 
of government.
30
  This latter point should be emphasised.  On Bevir‟s account, the 
degree of scrutiny to which the courts can subject executive decisions – whether 
Wednesbury standard reasonableness review or a power to strike down legislative 
decisions – is, seemingly, unimportant.  Yet it is contended however that this 
distinction is highly relevant to the dividing lines between elected and judicial power 
as it governs the degree to which courts can interfere with, or overturn, decisions 
taken following debate and deliberation by political actors.  Judicial review of 
administrative action in the United Kingdom has remained a largely procedural 
guarantee; the courts are concerned with the procedural and legal propriety of the 
impugned decision, not its merits.  The distinction between review and appeal 
therefore „reflects a conception of limited judicial authority, recognising that in most 
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cases a public authority may exercise a genuine choice between competing public 
policy objectives and contrasting methods of implementation.‟31   
The constitution can only therefore be effectively appreciated as a complex 
and fluctuating dynamic with circumstances – and the responses of relevant actors – 
determining whether its political or legal elements are placed at the fore.  While Bevir 
appears to lament the fact that „constitutional lawyers were slow to recognise the 
extent to which law intervened in politics‟32 he himself pays scant regard to the fact 
that the relationship between the two spheres is intimately intertwined; law may well 
intervene in matters of politics, but politics and political argument shape the law.  
Bevir argues that the „lingering presence of the Westminster model encourages the 
government to treat the law as apart from politics,‟33 yet ironically this is exactly what 
Bevir himself does, through his adoption of a particularly rigid interpretation of 
outdated Diceyan views and by giving little credence to the symbiotic relationships 
between legal and political processes and actors.   
   
LABOUR‟S CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AGENDA  
Bevir‟s contention is that Labour‟s constitutional reforms – instead of revitalising 
democratic participation – have „turned to judges as experts who can provide efficient 
protection of human rights and welfare.‟34  It is unsurprising then that Bevir‟s survey 
of the Labour reforms pays little attention to those developments which were 
specifically designed to enhance accountability and participation in the democratic 
process; among them, devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland,
35
 the 
creation of the Greater London Authority and election of Mayors in London
36
 and 
elsewhere,
37
 reforms to the party funding systems,
38
 the implementation of Freedom 
of Information legislation,
39
 the removal of the majority of hereditary peers from the 
Upper House
40
 and, most recently, the attempts to incorporate an elected membership 
to the House of Lords.
41
   
The lack of coverage of the devolution of power to Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland in this regard is of particular concern.  Contrary to the suggestions of 
Bevir, the manifest aim of the devolution of power to Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland was to enable the discharge of governmental functions at a level which was 
not as far removed from the concerns of the local electorate as Westminster, and to 
facilitate the ability of the local electorate to hold those making decisions on their 
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behalf to account.  Taking the devolution of power to Wales under the Government of 
Wales Act 1998 as an example, Wicks suggests:  
  
… the most important achievement of the 1998 scheme has been increased 
democratic legitimacy and accountability.  Powers – both executive and 
legislative – previously exercised by a minister in London (and, under the 
Conservatives, a minister unlikely to even represent a Welsh constituency) are 
exercised and scrutinised by Welsh politicians in Cardiff.
42
 
 
Not only were these new systems of government designed to enhance local 
accountability and representation, they were only implemented following popular 
endorsement by way of referendum.  The continuing utility of the referendum device 
as a mechanism to trigger or reject further constitutional amendment can be seen in 
legislative provisions regarding the self-determination rights of the Northern Ireland 
electorate,
43
 the popular rejection – in 2003 – of the Government‟s proposals for an 
elected regional assembly in the North East of England,
44
 and in the potential transfer 
of legislative power to the National Assembly for Wales.
45
   
Devolution in practice has seen the implementation of a number of systems of 
proportional representation designed to produce more equitable representation than 
the first past the post system currently used for elections to the Westminster 
Parliament.  The adoption of the additional member system in elections to the Scottish 
Parliament and National Assembly for Wales, alongside the use of the single 
transferrable vote system in Northern Ireland, has gone some way towards producing 
assemblies whose composition more accurately reflects the division of the popular 
vote between political parties than is evident at Westminster.  The unique power-
sharing arrangements put in place under the Northern Ireland Act 1998, and use of the 
d‟Hondt mechanism to allocate ministerial positions, take this notion of 
proportionality yet further, ensuring that legislative and executive positions reflect the 
division of votes cast and requiring that cross-community support – in preference to 
decision-making by simple majority – be necessary to achieve certain objectives.  In 
addition devolution has produced a number of innovative – in Westminster terms at 
least – mechanisms designed to increase participation in the democratic process, 
among them the establishment of the Public Petitions Committee in the Scottish 
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Parliament which provides a direct avenue for members of the electorate or groups to 
have their views aired in the legislative forum.   
The jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate over so-called „devolution issues‟ 
is of course a by-product of the devolution of power to Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland.  In theory, the transfer of power to the courts to determine disputes over the 
competences of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland‟s legislatures was itself an 
extension of judicial power to cover, and possibly curtail, the exercise of power by the 
newly-created democratically elected bodies.  Yet the practice of devolution disputes 
to date has given rise to only a limited body of case law dealing with human rights 
issues, and – contrary to the expectations of those commentators who predicted that 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council would „assume the role of a 
constitutional court‟46 – has to date given rise to no case law concerning disputes over 
competence between Westminster and the devolved administrations.
47
 
 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998   
The process of „juridification‟ precipitated by the Human Rights Act, Bevir writes, 
has seen Parliament „concede … to the judiciary the power of reviewing legislative 
acts against a formal written document.‟48  This potentially misleading assessment of 
the judicial role under the Act is then compounded by the wide-reaching assertions 
that:  
 
By empowering the courts with a new capacity to review domestic legislation, 
the Act effectively welcomes the courts into the policy-making process.   
 
And:  
 
Technically, the HRA still leaves the courts only interpreting prior [sic] 
legislation, although in practice they may come close to legislating.
49
   
 
This overly simplistic explanation of the effects of the Human Rights Act requires 
further analysis.  First, Bevir‟s assessment of the Human Rights Act pays scant regard 
to the fact that the system of rights protection which it establishes is manifestly not 
one which provides the judicial branch with the exclusive competence to determine 
those questions of human rights which arise by way of litigation in domestic courts.  
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The Human Rights Act was not intended to be – and has not been in practice – the 
sole preserve of the judges.  As a model of rights protection, the Act eschews the 
„orthodox precedents‟50 of other Bills of Rights by failing to provide a judicial power 
to invalidate legislation, and by providing mechanisms by which political and legal 
disagreement over questions of rights can be accommodated into existing 
constitutional arrangements.  It is for this reason that Lord Bingham was able, early in 
the life of the Human Rights Act, to say that, „[j]udicial recognition and assertion of 
the human rights defined in the Convention is not a substitute for the processes of 
democratic government but a complement to them.‟51  As a result, and rather than 
treating domestic courts as the ultimate arbiters of human rights in the UK, the 
Human Rights Act demands the participation of each of the branches of government 
and has been said to provoke a dialogue between the three arms:  
 
[the Human Rights Act] is informed by a view of human rights that 
acknowledges that they are not always, or even usually, absolute but derive 
from political struggle and thrive on political argument.  The purpose of the 
dialogue model is to keep the idea and dynamic of human rights alive, rather 
than close down the debate about them and hive them off to a rarefied court.
52
 
 
Parliamentary and executive input is therefore central to the operation of the Act.  The 
section 19 scrutiny procedure seeks to ensure that legislative proposals are vetted for 
compatibility with human rights standards during both policy making and 
parliamentary processes, while the „indefatigable‟53 Joint Parliamentary Committee 
on Human Rights has monitored legislative proposals, the implementation of remedial 
orders and conducted significant inquiries into wider human rights concerns.  Under 
section 3 the courts have undoubted power to interpret legislation „so far as it is 
possible to do so‟ to achieve compatibility with the Convention Rights.  But this 
power is not unlimited and in the event of the making of a declaration of 
incompatibility the elected branches will have the final say.  The role of judges under 
the Human Rights Act is therefore only part of a wider project concerning all three 
branches of government.     
Further, it is unclear how the ex post facto system of legislative „review‟ 
instigated by the Human Rights Act 1998 invites the judiciary to „make policy‟.  The 
powers of judicial review available to the judiciary under the Human Rights Act 
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afford neither an overarching power of review, nor a power to instigate any such 
review.  It is implicit in the design of the Human Rights Act that Parliament, and not 
the judiciary, possesses superior law making power, and the Act does nothing to 
attempt to insulate judicial opinion from the power of Parliament.  Neither a section 3 
interpretation, nor a section 4 declaration, affects the „validity, continuing operation or 
enforcement‟ of the statutory provision in respect of which it is made.  Further, the 
role of the courts is limited not only by the scope of the section 3 interpretative power 
(and the Convention rights with which the exercise of that power should be 
consonant), but also by the context of those cases which come before them.
54
  The 
courts can, as a result, „check only a portion of legislative activity.‟55    
It may be realistic to suggest that, in light of the ability of the courts to declare 
legislation incompatible, legislative decisions are taken in the knowledge of their 
possible subsequent „interpretation‟ under section 3 of the Act.  This is not however 
the same as suggesting – as Bevir does – that judges are now openly participating in 
the policy-making process.  As the above indicates, any judicial intervention must 
necessarily occur in response to a legislative decision already taken by Parliament in 
pursuance of a given policy aim.  At best this can be regarded as an indirect avenue 
into the policy-making process, and one which itself comes as a direct result of a 
specific Parliamentary intervention.        
While it is correct to assert that the role of the judges under section 3 of the 
Human Rights Act is to interpret legislation compatibly with the Convention Rights, 
Bevir‟s bald assertion that „in practice they may come close to legislating‟ is not 
developed at any level of detail.  Assertive and creative judicial interpretations have 
been deployed in adjudication under the Human Rights Act, yet it has been a 
recurring feature of litigation under the Act that the higher courts have been reluctant 
to act in a way which would overtly usurp the legislative function.
56
   Even in those 
instances in which section 3 has been used in the most robust or creative way the 
interpretations adopted have followed the clear authority of the European Court of 
Human Rights,
57
 and the courts have stopped short of rendering a statutory provision 
meaningless – that is effectively invalidating it – under the guise of interpretation.58   
It is true to say that, even within the system established by the Human rights 
Act, Parliament is not given free rein; any „dialogue‟ must take place within the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights to which the UK, as 
a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, remains subject.  But even 
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given this, Parliament has significant discretion over the nature of the response to 
either a declaration of incompatibility or judicial use of section 3(1); this is especially 
the case in those areas where qualified rights are in play, or in those areas in which the 
state response may be afforded a margin of appreciation by the Strasbourg Court.  
This may be a „juridification‟ of sorts, but not of the type where political judgment is 
entirely at the mercy of the judicial branch.    
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ACT 2005   
While discussion of the Human Rights Act as a catalyst of juridification is not 
surprising – it is widely accepted that the Act would see Parliament and the executive 
cede a degree of authority to the courts
59
 – Bevir‟s discussion of the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005 in similar terms is perplexing, for it is by no means clear that the 
creation of a Supreme Court for the United Kingdom will mark a further narrowing of 
the scope and range of power exercised by democratic institutions.  This is for the 
reason that the UK Supreme Court is not designed to be a Supreme Court in the US or 
Canadian sense; the new court will not possess a power of legislative strike down, nor 
will it be able to exercise a procedure of judicial reference akin to that available to the 
European Court of Justice – both innovations were rejected outright during the 
consultation process for the reason that they would „sit very uneasily‟ with our 
judicial and constitutional traditions.
60
  In short, the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 
will not transfer any additional power to the new Supreme Court which is not already 
held by existing judicial bodies.
61
  What the Act does, is transfer competence for the 
determination of „devolution issues‟ to the Supreme Court.  But – as Bevir 
acknowledges – this power is currently held by a court; the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council.  Beyond this, the new Supreme Court will exercise the exact same 
powers as currently exercised by the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords.  In 
fact, the creation of the Supreme Court should perhaps not be regarded as a novel or 
significant development at all, for the reason that, „[i]n devising the new court, the 
government … rejected almost every innovation that could have been introduced: in 
terms of its personnel, jurisdiction, and powers, the UK Supreme Court will closely 
replicate its predecessor.‟62    
 The creation of the Supreme Court will not therefore come hand in hand with 
an explicit extension of the jurisdiction of the UK‟s top courts.  It may be plausible to 
speculate that the establishment of the Supreme Court – and the increased institutional 
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separation from the legislature which will result – might coincide with an increased 
willingness to assert itself against the executive and possibly Parliament.  But at this 
stage – prior to the establishment of the Supreme Court – it is equally plausible to 
suggest that the emergence of the Law Lords from „beneath the robes of [the] 
legislative assembly‟63 might not be accompanied by the Supreme Court‟s immediate 
assertion of its new-found independence.  
 By contrast with Bevir‟s claims, two other significant accomplishments of the 
Constitutional Reform Act enhance, rather than diminish, effective political 
accountability.  The first of these achievements relates to the powers of the Lord 
Chancellor.  The Constitutional Reform Act saw the end of the Lord Chancellor‟s 
tripartite role as cabinet minister, head of the judiciary in England and Wales and 
speaker of the House of Lords.  The reformed office of Lord Chancellor retains only 
the first of those three roles, with the Lord Chief Justice becoming head of the 
judiciary in England and Wales, and the House of Lords now able to elect its own 
Lord Speaker.  Even as a Cabinet Minister however, the reformed office of Lord 
Chancellor has been shorn of a number of the responsibilities which had prompted 
calls for the abolition (or reform) of the office.  Foremost among them were the 
powers of the Lord Chancellor – exercised both personally and via recommendations 
to the Prime Minister – to exercise significant control over judicial appointments.  
Criticisms of the closed and secretive processes adopted had been widespread.
64
   
The establishment of a Judicial Appointments Commission has put in place a 
significantly more transparent process than previously existed.  While the holder of 
the reformed office of Lord Chancellor retains the power to make recommendations 
for certain judicial appointments to the Queen, the recommendation is made on the 
basis of a shortlist drawn up by the new Judicial Appointments Commission, which is 
in turn prepared with regard criteria specified by the Act.
65
  Parliamentary oversight 
of the processes of appointment is therefore both preserved – as the Lord Chancellor 
retains the formal power to make the recommendation for judicial appointment, and 
remains responsible to Parliament for so doing – and facilitated through an increased 
openness in the decision-making procedure.   
The other – related – achievement of the Constitutional Reform Act in respect 
of openness and accountability relates to the position of the Lord Chancellor within 
Parliament.  The fact that the Lord Chancellor exercised powers pertaining to legal 
and judicial policy had long been said to justify insulating the office holder from party 
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politics and as such the Lord Chancellor had, by convention, sat in the House of 
Lords.  Yet prior to the passing of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, such were the 
ministerial responsibilities of the holder of the office of Lord Chancellor that the 
holder of the position had become a „pivotal figure in several aspects of public life 
extending beyond the law and the administration of justice.‟66  The widening of the 
Lord Chancellor‟s responsibilities into areas of significant party political controversy 
with increasing resource implications had begun to undermine the grounds on which 
the office holder had traditionally not been drawn from the ranks of the House of 
Commons.  As Diana Woodhouse wrote in research published in 2001:  
 
Judicial independence has … been used to deflect criticism of the Lord 
Chancellor‟s lack of direct accountability to the elected chamber … Yet … the 
House of Lords … has no constitutional responsibility to hold Ministers to 
account for the way in which the money is spent.  Given the current status of 
the [Lord Chancellor‟s Department], as a large spending department, this is 
less than satisfactory, for it means the Lord Chancellor escapes the routine 
accountability, extracted from Ministers in charge of departments, and the 
requirement that he appears before the House to answer for his department 
when things go wrong.
67
    
 
Following the rejection of an amendment requiring that one of the qualifications 
required of potential holders of the post would be membership of the upper house, the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 does not require that future holders of the office of 
Lord Chancellor should sit in the House of Lords.  The cumulative effect of these 
changes is that the individual ministerial discretion available to an unelected politician 
in the area of judicial appointments has therefore been significantly reduced, while the 
likelihood that the holder of the office will be exposed to more meaningful 
parliamentary scrutiny regarding the discharge of all of the Lord Chancellor‟s 
responsibilities has been simultaneously increased.    
 
CONCLUSION   
Bevir‟s survey concludes by questioning whether „radical democracy and deliberative 
policy making‟ can be effectively realised in a constitution which is willing to place 
such trust in the power of the judicial branch.  Casting an eye ahead, Bevir suggests 
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that current constitutional discussions – for example on the potential development of a 
British Bill of Rights – will only further cement the „juridification‟ of politics.  Two 
final points should be made in response to this.  First, recent debates over 
constitutional reform have indicated that – in spite of the perceived „juridification‟ of 
the constitution – crises of accountability are not necessarily to be resolved through 
providing the judicial branch with increased power.  This is illustrated particularly 
well by debates over the proposed Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill, which contains 
significant extensions to Parliament’s power to hold the executive to account in the 
exercise of prerogative powers.
68
  That Parliament, and not the courts, is seen as the 
appropriate guarantor of accountability is both in defiance of the recent extension of 
judicial review into exercises of the prerogative,
69
 and illustrates the enduring 
relevance of established frameworks of accountability within the „political 
constitution.‟     
Further, the Bill of Rights debate has been spurred by popular and political 
scepticism over the judicial enforcement of human rights under the Human Rights Act 
1998.  Indeed, given the current policy of David Cameron‟s Conservative Party, it is 
hard to take seriously Bevir‟s suggestion that „juridification – especially judicial 
review with reference to codified rights – appears to have become an unquestioned 
doxa of British politics.‟70  Far from being an accepted orthodoxy, adjudication over 
questions of rights by the judiciary has – in spite of the careful balance between 
elected and judicial power apparent on the face of the Act – become perhaps the most 
controversial of Labour‟s constitutional reforms, and the one which, in the present 
political climate, appears most under threat of repeal.   
 It is equally plausible to argue that Labour‟s programme of constitutional 
reform has contributed to a significant democratisation of the constitution, and that 
the promise of future constitutional renovation demonstrates that our elected 
representatives are not yet ready to cede complete constitutional authority to the 
judicial branch.  While a degree of „juridification‟ may be perceived in the 
development of the constitution, the codification of legal rights and expansion of the 
judicial review jurisdiction may also be defended as integral to the rule of law.  Such 
developments are entirely in keeping with the dynamic nature of the unwritten 
constitution, and are by no means indicative of the transfer of ultimate constitutional 
authority from Parliament to the courts.  The political constitution is not yet dead.     
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